The name can be one item, either first name last name or last name, first name (the comma is very important!), or the name can be two separate items, the first name, then the last name. The student id should be first, followed by the student name. When importing students, each line in the text or csv file should have one student. The import will always go into the currently open class, so if you want to create a new class and import your roster, be sure to create the new class first by clicking the + button on the top left. When you open a text or csv file, Gradekeeper will determine whether you are importing students or an assignment. Nous, 52(4), 723–751.As mentioned in my post about the new version of the web app, you can now import an assignment from a text or csv file. Steinberg (Eds.), Varieties of dependence: Ontological dependence, grounding, supervenience, response-dependence. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 116(3), 395–402. Wasserman (Eds.), Metametaphysics: New essays on the foundations of ontology (pp. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 60(1), 67–85. An argument against the causal theory of action explanation. A certain kind of trinity: Dependence, substance, explanation. Schnieder (Eds.), Metaphysical grounding: Understanding the structure of reality (pp. Grounding, transitivity, and contrastivity. Hoffmann (Eds.), Modality: Metaphysics, logic, and epistemology (pp. Metaphysical dependence: Grounding and reduction. Davidsonian causalism and wittgensteinian anti-causalism: A rapprochement. Corry (Eds.), Causation, physics, and the constitution of reality: Russell’s republic revisited (pp. Metaphysics as modeling: The handmaiden’s tale. How general do theories of explanation need to be? Nous, 44(2), 305–328. Following logical realism where it leads. Logical realism and the metaphysics of logic. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 16(3), 247–273. Grounding and metaphysical explanation: It’s complicated. Grounding and the argument from explanatoriness.
Explanatory knowledge and metaphysical dependence. Supervenience as a philosophical concept. Explanatory realism, causal realism, and explanatory exclusion. General theories of explanation: Buyer beware. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.ĭíez, J., Khalifa, K., & Leuridan, B. Explanatory rivals and the ultimate argument. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.ĭasgupta, S. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Ĭorreia, F., & Schnieder, B. Metaphysical grounding: Understanding the structure of reality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Ĭorreia, F., & Schnieder, B. In Davies & Clayton (Eds.), The re-emergence of emergence (pp. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Ĭhalmers, D. Representing and explaining: The Eikonic conception of scientific explanation. Distinguishing explanatory from nonexplanatory fictions. London: Palgrave Macmillan.īiggs, S., & Wilson, J. Daly (Ed.), The Palgrave handbook of philosophical methods (pp. Grounding: towards a theory of the in-virtue-of relation. I articulate a non-realist backing model and argue that this model can satisfy most of the motivations for a realist backing model, and that it can also play a central and illuminating role in the practice of metaphysics.Īchinstein, P. In light of recent critiques of explanatory realism, in this paper I explore the prospects for a backing model without explanatory realism. Combining explanatory realism with a backing model permits conclusions about metaphysics to follow straightforwardly from facts about explanation, and those who endorse backing models of explanation have typically endorsed explanatory realism. Such inferences from explanation to metaphysics typically rely on two elements: explanatory realism, the view that it is a characteristic and necessary aspect of explanation to give information about metaphysical structure, and a backing model of explanation, according to which explanations are backed by supporting relations, such as causation. Facts about explanation are often taken as a guide to facts about metaphysics.
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